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CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
RICHARD

V.

FALCON*

The general American rule requires litigants to bear their
own attorneys' fees regardless of the respective merits of their
cases or the outcome of their litigation. The American rule is
often defended as a democratic rule that encourages resort to
courts, avoids imposing undue burdens on the loser and gives
recognition to the "gambling" aspects of litigation. Nevertheless,
the rule's inequitable effects have so concerned legislatures and
courts that they have created a surprising number of exceptional
instances where attorneys' fees are awarded.
Despite the American rule's claim to historical and traditional validity, when legislatures or courts have thought it wise
or expedient to redress fully the injury caused by wrongdoing, to
extend equal access to the courts, to reward particularly the litigant with a meritorious case, to discourage abusive resort to frivolous litigation or simply to encourage the bringing of types of suits
whose litigation is felt to be important, they have often permitted
or required awards of attorneys' fees. The categories of cases thus
excepted are broad in coverage. But, because the categories of
cases in which fee awards can be made are viewed as exceptions
and because there is not yet a well accepted general principle
explaining their purpose or application, cases within an excepted
category are often inconsistent and unpredictable in result.
The purpose of this article is not to establish abstractly that
the American rule ought to be replaced with one which generally
permits fee awards in all litigation. Rather, after outlining the
English practice and early American experience under the American rule, this article will consider the rule's attractions and defects, particularly when its effect is to require a successful litigant
*
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in a civil rights or constitutional case to bear his own fees. This
article will then canvass the exceptions which have been thus far
created in response to the rule's operation in certain types of
cases. It will note that these exceptions are intended to permit
and often do permit awards of fees in civil rights and constitutional cases and that adoption of a principle which generally allows fee awards in these cases would, therefore, be neither novel
nor unexpected. Finally, the article will attempt to formulate a
general principle which will operate to require fee awards in all
such cases and to defend adoption of that principle.
THE AMERICAN PRACTICE: BACKGROUND, DEFENSE AND CRITICISM

The English legal system early developed a rule that successful parties were entitled to an award of costs, and significantly,
"costs" in the English scheme of things included awards for counsel's fees.' There is some doubt concerning the time at which fees
and costs were first generally awarded by English courts, but
there is no question that a complete system of awards of costs and
fees to the prevailing party, at all levels of litigation and in all
types of cases, existed in England at the time of the American
revolution.2
The English method for determination of costs has been described elsewhere,' and its details need not concern us here. Suffice it to note that lengthy and detailed schedules, outlined in
1. The terms "costs" and "fees" are subject to a variety of meanings. In one sense,
"costs" of a lawsuit is often understood, particularly by laymen, to refer to the actual
expense incurred as a result of litigation, i.e., all items of expenditure including charges
which must be paid to a lawyer for rendering professional services. For the layman,
therefore, "costs" in a lawsuit represent his actual expenditures whether reimbursed or
not.
However, the terms "fees" and "costs" have distinctly different meanings in the
context of the subject matter of this article. "Fees" refers to those charges paid by a party
to his lawyer for professional services rendered. "Costs," on the other hand, simply refers
to those expenses of litigation which are awarded, by statute or court rule, to one party
(usually, the winning party) and taxed against the other. Cf. Distler, The Course of Costs
of Course, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 76 (1960). Obviously, taxable "costs" may cover, in a given
instance, all, or more than all, of the actual litigation expense, including legal fees, as,
e.g., in certain antitrust cases, or they may cover less, indeed much less than such expenses. For purposes of this article, consistent with the traditional usage of lawyers, "costs"
will refer to those costs "generally" taxable against one party excluding "attorney's fees"
(even in those few instances in which such "fees" are taxed against one party) since under
the American system fees are not generally awarded as part of costs.
2. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO.
L. REv. 202, 207 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck]; and Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE
L.J. 849, 853-54 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Goodhart].
3. See Goodhart at 851-54.
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court rules, govern their award. Amounts paid to court officers are
recoverable, as they are generally in the United States. More
significantly, fees paid to lawyers are recoverable, on an item-byitem basis, for their services. The court scheddles list fixed sums
taxable as costs for each particular service performed by the lawyer, e.g., the writing of a letter, or the filing of a brief.4
The American experience has been fundamentally different,
despite its origins in the English legal system. Concerning the
practices followed by early colonial courts, there is some disagreement among writers.' Whatever the colonial practice, it was soon
4. Given the fixed nature of the schedule, the fee awards, which incidentally are paid
directly to the client, are not necessarily sufficient to cover the client's full costs and fees.
There are similar procedures followed in other European countries, with the same results,
i.e., tedious filing of schedules and, in certain cases, underpayment to the client. See the
collection of interesting articles on continental practices in 1962 Proceedingsof the A.B.A.
Intern. and Comp. Law Section 119-142 (1963). The important point here is the rather
universal agreement that a prevailing party should, as part of his remedy, receive fees as
part of his recompense for actual loss resulting from the wrongdoer's acts. This makes
obvious sense. To the extent that litigation is necessary to right the wrong done a party,
any realistic measure of the loss occasioned by that wrong must take into account the
client's loss of moneys paid his attorney.
5. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 873, citing C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR 4 (1913), suggests that the American colonies never followed the English commonlaw practice of awarding fees as part of costs, and he offers as a reason the distrust of and
disrespect toward lawyers by most of the colonial citizenry:
In every one of the Colonies, practically throughout the Seventeenth Century,
a lawyer or attorney was a character of disrepute and of suspicion, of whose standing
of power in the community the ruling class, whether it was the clergy as in New
England, or the merchants as in New York, Maryland and Virginia, or the Quakers
as in Pennsylvania, was extremely jealous. In many of the Colonies, persons acting
as attorneys were forbidden to receive any fee; in some, all paid attorneys were
barred from the courts; in all, they were subjected to the most rigid restrictions as
to fees and procedures.
Others, however, have intimated that most colonial courts adopted the English practice,
albeit without ever intending to reimburse the wronged party as part of the full compensation to which he was entitled. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 235 (1935) (not suggesting a
lack of intent to reimburse wronged party); Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the
Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 80 (1953). The latter view, given the widespread existence of statutory maximums contained in many early colonial and state laws,
seems the more accurate. Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of
Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 80 n.17 (1953). Indeed, one writer, in considering early
statutory history, suggests that the existence of monetary maximums explains the gradual
replacement of the English practice with the American rule that fees were not recoverable.
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792,
799 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]. Ehrenzweig reasons that these maximums
became unrealistically low and that lawyers and judges soon lost sight of their possible
utilization as a compensatory mechanism. Thus they early rejected awards of fees as part
of the law of damages.
Be that as it may, it seems apparent that early courts and legislatures did not consider the English practice suitable to the United States. The underlying motivation which
produced this result was probably a combination of historical accidents, as suggested by
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widely established that attorneys' fees were not taxable as costs
in American courts. This perhaps overstates the case. It is true
that in most cases, no attorneys' fees are recoverable, yet the
number of exceptions to the general rule is sufficiently large because in many of its applications the "American rule" is: believed
to be undesirable.',
Application of the American Rule to Civil Rights and
ConstitutionalLitigation
Civil rights cases-those cases in which private or public
action is challenged on the ground that it is racially discriminatory-and constitutional cases-those cases in which the acts of
a government official, acting pursuant to state or federal law, are
challenged and decided on the grounds that they transgress limitations found in the United States Constitution-are litigation of
public moment. 7 Successful litigation is often significant in securing the benefits of civil rights and constitutional principles. Thus,
practices which unduly burden or discourage potential litigants
in these cases are particularly undesirable. Indeed, it is upon
these cases that the criticisms of prevailing American practice are
often focused, as later discussion will reveal in greater detail.,
Constitutional limitations are seldom accidentally transgressed by an unthinking government. More frequently a government official who violates the rights of citizens acts in accordance
with his perception of the desires of the politically powerful
among his constituency. Discriminators seldom choose their victims in an historical vacuum. More frequently, they act in acEhrenzweig, the extreme distrust with which lawyers were held, as suggested by Goodhart,
and, finally, as suggested by others, the uniquely American viewpoint that litigation is a
fiercely individualistic gamble, in which pluck, as much as right, determines and ought
to determine outcome. See Note, Attorneys Fees: Where Should the Ultimate Burden Lie,
20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
6. See discussion at note 33 et seq., infra.
7. Although the term "civil rights" is broader than the concepts advanced in these
"race" cases, it has long been used to refer to this specific area. See, e.g., the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Obviously, many "civil rights" cases are also "constitutional litigation" as so defined,
e.g., school desegregation cases. There is, however, reason for distinguishing among these
cases for purposes of this article. Many civil rights cases are brought against private
parties, whereas, "constitutional litigation", as here defined, involves challenges to public
acts, to state action rather than to purely private conduct. As this article will note, this
important distinction has some bearing on the question of awards of attorney's fees. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 106 and 107 infra.
Because of their very different content, criminal cases, even though they often are
defended on civil rights or constitutional grounds, are beyond the scope of this article.
8. See discussion in text accompanying notes 97 et seq., infra.
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cordance with the perceived racial and class biases of their time.
Those who bear the brunt of unconstitutional or discriminatory
behavior, therefore, are most often, if not invariably, politically
friendless. This class often overlaps, but is not totally
synonymous with, the economically weak. Members of this class
need access to courts. Almost by definition, their limited access
to the political sphere permits governmental and private transgressions at their expense. Their access to courts is of particular
urgency. Most obviously is this true for the minorities for whose
primary benefit the civil rights amendments and statutes exist.
This lack of access also characterizes, although less obviously,
those for whose benefit restraints on majority action have been
made part of the Constitution.
In any civil rights or constitutional case, claims for damages
are likely to be secondary, if present at all. The redress sought
most often is both prospective and equitable, yet the costs of
proving a case for equitable relief are high. Even such unsatisfactory devices as the contingent fee are not available to the wouldbe litigant. The most he can hope for is to seek redress by bearing
the cost himself, if he can afford to do so, or, failing that, to find
some generous and sympathetic attorney or organization which
will take his case. Indeed, the case is that the needs of the most
disfavored of the minority are most often ignored by the organized
bar. The public air of hostility or resistance to the legitimate
demands of these persons are factors that weigh heavily in attorneys' decisions to accept these cases, particularly non-fee generating or low fee casesY
Application of the American rule, in this context, is therefore
paradoxical. These cases should be encouraged, precisely because
they benefit a politically and often times economically weak
class. However, the American rule operates to discourage these
cases. It limits litigation to those suits within the financial capacity of the individuals affected or of the charitable organizations
and lawyers interested in their litigation. With these effects, it
would seem that little could be said in defense of the American
rule. But defended, nonetheless, it often is.
Defenses Advanced in Favor of the American Rule
Critics of the American rule,"' as well as its supporters,"
9. -Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A.J. 25, 27, 148-49 (1962).
10. See, e.g., Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA
L. REv. 75 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kuenzell; Goodhart, supra note 2, at 872-78;
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advance a number of arguments in its favor, albeit seldom in the
specific context of the cases with which this article is concerned.
These arguments must be considered, for, if they make sense in
a general context, they may well make sense in this more narrow
context.
The most persuasive argument is grounded in the belief that
an award of attorneys' fees is necessarily punitive in that it requires payment of fees for assertion of a right-the right to litigate: "No litigant ought to be punished under the guise of an
award of counsel fees (or in any other manner) from taking a
position in court in which he honestly believes-however lacking
in merit that position may be."' 2 This point of view effectively
begs the question-is there, or ought there be, a right to litigate
any issue, despite its merits and despite the cost thereby incurred
by the other party who, given the outcome, must have been the
wronged party? If such a right exists, then the view expressed is
entitled to respect. There are those who assert such a right: "The
right to sue without deterrence by the specter of the possibility
of paying an adversary's legal fees is part of our democratic tradition and a bulwark of equality ...
""
Another statement of this position defends the present American system from the viewpoint of the "poor" or "moderate income" litigant:
It has not been accident that the American litigant must
bear his own cost of counsel and other trial expense save for
minimal court costs, but a deliberate choice to ensure that
access to the courts be not effectively denied those of moderate means."
A second defense to fee awards is based on an artificially
Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 218.
11. See, e.g., Satterthwaite, IncreasingCosts to be Paid by Losing Party,46 N.J.L.J.
133 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Satterthwaite]; Watson, A Rationale of the Law of Costs,
CENT. L.J. 306 (1883).
12. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd
and modified, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
13. Geller, Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested
Remedy, Report of Committee on Comparative Procedure and Practice, 1962 Proceedings
of the A.B.A. Intern. and Comp. Law Section 134 (1963).
14. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Judges Smith, Clark and Hays, dissenting in Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 324 F.2d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 1963)). See also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), in which the Court suggests that denial of attorney's
fees is helpful to the indigent who would otherwise be "unjustly discouraged from institut"
ing actions to vindicate [his] rights ....
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attenuated definition of the compensable damages caused by a
wrongdoer's activities. This defense is based on a denial that
attorneys' fees are "proximately" incurred as a result of wrongful
acts: "Now the expenses of litigation. . . are not the 'natural and
proximate consequences of the wrongful act,' .
but are remote,
future and contingent."'"
Yet a third defense of the American rule has its basis in the
belief that the outcome of a law suit in American courts is no
indicator of right and wrong, or, restated, that making a loser pay
his opponent's legal fee is adding insult to injury:
The scheme urged [the loser to pay all costs] is based on
the wholly unwarranted assumption that the losing party in
litigation is always, or even ordinarily, in the wrong. Its sole
justification must be that an adverse verdict by a jury or an
unfavorable decision of the court carries with it the necessary
conclusion that the defeated party was morally culpable in
bringing action, or in resisting suit, as the case may be.
Nothing could be further from the actual facts of life ...
An enlightened Judge must realize that, in spite of his most
conscientious and painstaking efforts, he is, in a given case,
as like as not to do injustice when he seeks to do justice.'"
These arguments and defenses seem ill-founded.
It is ironic to defend the American rule on the basis that it
"insures access to the courts for those of moderate means," by not
"punishing" the "taking of a position in which [one] honestly
believes-however lacking in merit." Indeed, it is cruelly ironic,
for those of "moderate" (or less) means are now excluded. A
major factor of that exclusion is that a litigant must bear his own
litigation expenses, regardless of the merit of his case.' 7 Because
the poor are already excluded from active participation in the
legal system-whatever merits a suggestion that the fear of incurring additional litigation costs will exclude indigent participation
may have, in vacuo-this defense has little substance in the context of a legal system in which free access does not exist.
As is often commented, a litigant without independent
means to support his principles simply cannot, and will not, litigate unless his claim is of sufficient size to justify payment of
15. Saint Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355, 366 (1857).
16. Satterthwaite, supra note 11, cited in Goodhart, supra note 2, at 877.
17. See, e.g., Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381, 423 (1965); Comment, ProvidingLegal Services for the Middle Class
in Civil Matters: The Problem, the Duty and a Solution, 26 U. lTr. L. REv. 811 (1965).
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substantial lawyer's fees."5 Consider, for example, a claim for less
than $500, an amount which is a realistic limit for cases arising
in the commercial and consumer transaction area. Assuming that
a client has a meritorious claim, arising, for example, from breach
of an implied warranty of merchantibility in an air-conditioning
sales contract, litigation is not likely to be to his economic advantage-a fact not lost on the cantankerous defaulter. Regardless of
the respective merit of their claims, a "big" litigant can always
beat a "little" opponent because of their respective abilities to
bear the cost of litigation." Therefore, given widespread lack of
access to the courts, it seems simply untrue that an award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party would preclude the bringing of a greater number of meritorious claims by poor citizens
than are now precluded by their economic inability to retain
counsel.
Hence, to the extent that the American rule is defensible
because it permits the "taking of a position in which [the litigant] honestly believes," its beneficial effect is limited to that
litigant who is both sufficiently wealthy and sufficiently committed to the principle he espouses to incur the costs of litigation.
Burdening those both wealthy enough and frivolous enough to
assert claims "lacking in merit," even if "honestly believed in,"
is a small price to pay to gain the benefits of fee awards.
Considered in this light, the second point given in defense of
the American rule, that an attorney's fees is not a proximate,
compensable result of wrongdoing, lacks persuasive force. As a
matter of logic, the expenses of litigation are predictable consequences of a wrongful act. Moreover, they become so precisely
because the wrongdoer chooses to defend the claim. Thus, not
only are such expenses "foreseeable," but they are at all times
within the control of the wrongdoer.
Differently and more importantly, this defense of the American rule begs the precise question by hiding it within the confines
of the legal concept of "proximate cause." Obviously, the law
does not and even ideally cannot assume complete compensation,
in money, for all the consequences of a wrongful act. Among all
of the varied losses, the law selects certain risks (which it calls
'unreasonable," "foreseeable," "natural") and requires the
18. Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 792.
19. The problem is not limited to the "poor" plaintiff. For example, a defendant
may be forced to settle a case, because the expense of successfully defending the suit may
exceed the settlement cost. See discussion note 25 infra and accompanying text.
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wrongdoer to pay for these, while others, even if they are as "empirically predictable" as the former, the case law finds it best not
to recompense. The problem here, most agree, is one of expediency and public policy rather than scientific probability-some
interests are protected, others not. 21'The true policy question is
the extent to which we wish to permit wrongdoers to escape the
consequences of wrongful litigation.
The incurring of legal expenses should be recognized, by an
award of fees, simply as a matter of consistency with existing
practice. After all, these expenses are closely analagous to permitting recovery of expenses incurred in protecting, or receiving,
property. Indeed, if recovery of property from a defaulting debtor
requires a creditor to expend money in finding it or in securing
possession, the creditor is entitled to reimbursement: Why should
it be any the less so, if the expense necessarily incurred is that of
hiring an attorney, rather than that of hiring a tow truck?
Ultimately, such legal expenses deserve to be recognized as
"proximate consequences" as a matter of justice, because recognition would make whole those who deserve to be made whole,
those whose claims are meritorious:
There is another reason for adopting the principle of substantial costs . . . . It does justice. . . . On what principle
of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully rundown on a public
highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill?"
Especially is awarding fees, in recognition of their proximate
relation to the wrongs done, truly a matter of justice in the context of civil rights and constitutional litigation. Since the judgments given are usually equitable and prospective, no economic
loss is incurred by the wrongdoer. Even if the case be brought and
won, the cost of securing the rights vindicated are borne by the
party deprived of them in the first instance. The cost of disobedience to constitutional or statutory command and its correction
falls on the party seeking obedience, rather than on the one who
disobeyed. A system purposely designed to forestall litigation
aimed at vindicating important public rights could not be more
effective than the present system which so penalizes those seeking
vindication of those rights. This unjust result was surely not the
design of the American rule, although it often is its effect.
20. See, e.g., R.E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAw OF TORTS (1963).
21. First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, MASS. L. Q. vol. 11 No.
1, at 64 (1925).
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A response of those who defend the American rule is that
winning a law suit is no sign of merit and that fee awards would
therefore be unjust, as often as not. This position, the third defense of the American rule, is fundamentally incorrect. Granted
that some decisions are wrong-unless we are willing to concede
that our legal system is as often wrong as right-the effect of this
objection is to burden the vast majority of innocent parties with
the costs incurred at the hands of wrongdoers, so that a few innocent be spared the additional cost of an opponent's legal fees
when they lose. We need not concede that our legal system is so
random in its results:
Is not the answer to this that the cost must be paid by one
party or the other, and that, in spite of Mr. Satterthwaite's
pessimism, it is at least more probable that the losing party
was in the wrong? If. . . justice is so much a matter of luck,
it hardly seems worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it
would be cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin.22
If we start with the assumption that our legal system usually does
allow the meritorious claim to prevail, once we appreciate the
tremendous exclusionary effect the present rule has on all but the
well-to-do, we must conclude that the assertion of an unfettered
right to litigate meritless claims at the cost of diminution or
extinguishment of the right to litigate claims with merit is not
entitled to respect. To the extent that imposition of awards of
attorneys' fees would permit the poor greater access to courts 3
22. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 877.
23. Ehrenzweig's autobiographical account and suggestion deserve setting out in full
on this point:
When I came to this country twenty-seven years ago, I was penniless, did not
speak English, had to support wife, children and parents, and was unable to use
anything that I had learned and done as a judge and law teacher in my first
life . . .
[An American moving firm had cheated us out of our last belongings. . . .I
was, of course, directed to a fine lawyer. "Sure," he said, "you have an airtight
claim, and I shall take your case, but you will understand, I must have one hundred
dollars as a retainer." I did not understand. Would he not get his fees from the
defendant, as he would anywhere else in the world? I did not have the hundred
dollars and even if I had won, I would not have been made whole for I had to pay
my own lawyer. Of course I did not sue. The little man had lost. ...
Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 792.
And as an American citizen I know that all the law offers the little man outside
that second-rate court at some places and at some times, is charity. Legal aid,
rather than legal right. If access to the court is said to be an inalienable right in
the most rigid dictatorship, money then is the way to justice in the world's greatest
democracy. But not only the little man is in jeopardy, the legal profession is hurting
itself immeasurably by its doting on what it wrongly believes to be a hallowed
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and would result in other benefits, without impairing the justice
of the result, we must favor imposition of such costs.
Other Benefits of Fee Awards
Aside from increased access of the legally poor to the courts,
a correlative benefit would be an augmentation by volume of
cases of the utmost public importance. These cases, particularly
those involving litigation of civil rights and constitutional claims,
usually assert a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, or other
relief nominal in monetary terms. Theoretically, the right asserted is entitled to judicial vindication, but because legal fees
must be borne by the injured party, and the contingent fee or
similar devices are unavailable, only those financially able to do
so can seek that vindication. And it is probably a fact that the
party most needing the remedy is the party least able to afford
the litigation costs. Traditionally, these cases have been brought
because of the "charitable" impulses of "do-good" lawyers or
institutions. Even with this device the litigated case is the exception rather than the rule."
Some proponents of fee awards have suggested a further benefit: The augmentation resulting from increased access will not
increase congested court dockets, but will relieve that congestion.
This effect is not inconsistent with broader access despite the
tradition. From my experience as an Austrian judge I know that these hundreds of
thousands of honest claims which now are either contemptuously disposed of by
"law-less" magistrates as not worthy of the law's and the lawyer's attention, or
condescendingly "aided" by the generosity of the profession and its apprentices, or
simply suppressed by lack of machinery, all those hundreds of thousands of honest
claims, if made recoverable by a reform of our system of counsel fees, would become
the daily bread of a new proud profession of "little lawyers" serving the little
man-as they do everywhere else in the world ....
Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 796.
24. As Ehrenzweig characterizes this state of affairs, these suits become matters of
"legal aid rather than legal right," Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 796. The incentive value
of fee awards in this area has led to a number of courts, aided by congressional assent, to
shift litigation expenses in class action cases for injunctive relief precisely because dependence on charity hardly bespeaks decent judicial responsiveness to the importance of the
issues presented:
Congress did not intend that vindication of statutorily guaranteed rights would
depend on the rare likelihood of economic resources in the private party (or class
members) or the availability of legal assistance from charity-individual, collective
or organized. An enactment aimed at legislatively enhancing human rights . . .
through equality of treatment would hardly be served by compelling victims to seek
out charitable help.
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970) (attorneys' fees
to be paid by defendant in a successful suit by plaintiff under Title I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
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apparent inconsistency. It is common "lawyer's knowledge" that
financial advantage may result from filing or defending a meritless case. Familiar examples include the nuisance suit, whose
settlement value is a direct function of the cost of asserting defenses,25' and the litigious defendant whose financial position is sufficiently strong to permit him to "wear down" his opponent by1
constant assertion of ultimately meritless defenses and appeals.
Especially is this the case in civil rights and constitutional
litigation. Under the American rule, the defendant whose acts
violate constitutional or statutory principles has little to lose by
insisting on litigation with a legally poor plaintiff. If he should
lose his case, the result most often is prospective equitable relief.
That is, he is ordered to stop doing in the future what he should
never have done in the past. If there is no real possibility that he
will have to pay the fees of the prevailing party, he has little to
lose, and a chance of something to win, including the chance to
win by merely "wearing" his opponent down, if he persists. The
"odds" are such that he is a fool not to "gamble" on being able
to continue his unlawful practices. Assessing attorneys' fees
against the loser will hardly end these practices-but it will make
it more expensive. If the party abusing the court system has to
bear the cost of that abuse, the number of abuses can be expected
to decrease.2 7 Therefore, awards of fees should operate as an in25. A plaintiff may come with a groundless claim and realize this financial
advantage because the defendant will prefer to pay the plaintiff an amount less
than the expense of fighting the case. This is the nuisance value of the suit, made
possible by making a defendant balance the cost of payment to the plaintiff against
the expense of litigating. Defendant's litigation expenses afford the plaintiff a legalized form of blackmail.
Kuenzel, supra note 10, at 78.
26. Conversely, a defendant may obstruct action as long as possible in the
trial court, and regardless of merit, after judgment against him, appeal to as many
courts as possible on the chance that because of the time and expense involved he
will extract a settlement from the plaintiff less than the amount of the judgment.
There is only the favorable possibility that the plaintiff will settle for less, particularly if he is in an acute financial condition. Not only because of the delay itself,
but also because of the present cost structure of the courts, the defendant can
realize a financial advantage by placing this economic pressure on the plaintiff.
Id.
27.
If a party abusing the system is made to pay the actual expense of the
injury caused, it is to his financial advantage not to abuse the system. The possibility of having to pay a lawyer's fee for both sides of the litigation would make a
plaintiff think twice before he files a petition. It would require a defendant to
consider carefully before he defends an action that should not be defended or
appeals a case that should not be appealed. Opponent's attorney's fees as costs are
consequently a direct deterrent to the number of cases put or kept in suit, and the
congestion is reduced. Although the assessment of these costs will not prohibit the
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centive to settle cases on the basis of merit rather than respective
wealth-on principle rather than principal."
This potential favorable impact on court congestion is merely
a secondary benefit of fee awards. Although commentators have
supported fee awards precisely because they believe such awards
would result in relieving court congestion,29 this result is not certain. Presently, we can assume that as a matter of probability,
many meritorious cases are not brought because of the expense
involved in litigation. These cases could be economically pursued
if the wronged party were reasonably certain of recovering fees.
Whether this class of cases outnumbers the "meritless" cases
whose incidence would be reduced is problematic. The value of
fee awards is not the relief of court congestion. That result can,
be achieved in a number of ways, including our present way of
limiting access to those with the price of admission. To the extent
that the problem of court congestion will be aided by awarding
fees, only a secondary, though happy, effect results. The primary
effect sought is not that relief-it is access itself that should properly concern us.
The uneven burdens created by the American rule and the
lack of merit in most of the defenses urged in its support have led
to dissatisfaction with many of its applications. In response, a
number of attempts to extend legal services have evolved. Thus,
the contingent fee device in tort cases, 30 the widespread use of
class actions,"1 and the unsatisfactory institution of the small
claims court32 are all attempts to cure problems caused by the
operation of the American rule. These are, at best, stop-gap and,
at worst, insufferable.
A more straightforward response is simple alteration of the
utilization of the system either in a proper or an improper manner, it deters the
use in an improper manner to the extent that the party abusing the system will pay
the actual expense of the injury caused.
Id. at 80. But see Note, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees, 4 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L.
REV. 223, 228 (1969).
28. See discussion in text accompanying note 131 infra.
29. See, e.g., First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts,MASS. L.Q. vol.
11, No. 1, at 63 (1925).
30. For a discussion of the contingent fee, see V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 153-60 (1966); F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1964).
31. See discussion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. "[Tihe small claims court is unavailable in innumerable communities; and
. . . where it exists, it is prevailingly a collection agency, and presents otherwise the
horrifying spectacle of a court without law ....
"
Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 796-97. See also D.W. LOUISELL & G.C. HAZARD, PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE (1973) for a a collected bibliography.
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American rule. No court, or legislature, has yet attempted to go
so far. Tradition and history seem too much with us. Instead,
courts have created a host of exceptions to the American rule, in
which process they have been spurred by legislation and, of late,
by increasing concern over the American rule's effect in cases
which are deemed to be of particular public benefit.
Today, no general principle has emerged. Exceptions to the
general rule are spotty in coverage, at best, and often unpredictable in application. However, these exceptions may yield a general
principle which would justify fee awards in all civil rights and
constitutional litigation, without a significant alteration-which
courts would make with reluctance-of either the present American rule or its exceptions.
CURRENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE

American courts have power to award fees pursuant to statutory authorization or in the exercise of traditional equity jurisdiction. We shall first examine the statutory exceptions and then
turn to the extra statutory exceptions currently accepted.
Statutory Exceptions to the American Rule
The number of federal statutes authorizing or mandating
awards of lawyers' fees is impressively large and is growing. There
are also a large number of state statutory provisions.3 The federal
statutes are of two distinct types, either expressly mandatory or
discretionary. Judicial interpretation, however, has somewhat
diminished the significance of this distinction.
The mandatory type of federal statute requires fee awards
upon a showing that a prevailing party has been injured by a
violation of the statute. For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act34
provides that a creditor who fails to disclose required information
shall be liable for certain minimum and maximum damage
amounts plus "in the case of any successful action to enforce the
foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court."3
33. State statutory provisions are beyond the scope of this article. However, it
should be noted that such state statutes are neither new, nor are they insignificant,
although they are not nearly as broad in scope or coverage as the federal statutes to be
discussed.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 et seq. (1970).
35. Other statutes mandating awards include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970) (In antitrust civil actions, the plaintiff "shall recover threefold the Damages. ...
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Judicial response to these mandatory statutes has uniformly
and properly recognized them as legislative determinations of the
necessity for, and efficacy of, private litigation as an adjunct to
public enforcement of the statute:
The scheme of the statute, as both sides agree, is to create a
species of "private attorney general" to participate prominently in enforcement. The language should be construed
liberally in light of its broadly remedial purpose. . . .Congress made clear its broader scheme, and broader system of
reimbursement, for private enforcement. It invited people
like the present plaintiff, whether they were themselves deceived or not, to sue in the public interest. Following familiar
precedents, it encouraged such actions by providing, in addition to the incentive of public service, costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee above the minimum recovery of $100. . .. "I'
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."); the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970) ("Any person injured ... shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."); the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) ("The court in such action
shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant and costs of the
action."); and the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970) ("[A] reasonable
counsel or attorney's fee, [is] to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery .... ").
See also those more limited mandatory fee award statutes which require awards to
be made to a party injured by the taxed party's violation of an administrative agency's
order issued pursuant to the statute, e.g., the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 210(f) (1970); the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970);
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); and the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970). These statutes are similar in principle to the long accepted power
of courts to require a contemner to pay the petitioner's attorney's fees in contempt cases
instituted as a result of the contemner's violation of a court order. See R. GOLDFARB, THE
CONTEMPr POWER (1971). Thus, the statutes serve the limited purpose of granting the
orders of these administrative agencies the same dignity and force as a court order.
36. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (decided under the Truth-in-Lending Act). The court subsequently
awarded attorney's fees of $20,000, the amount reached by agreement of the parties,
despite the fact that only the $100 minimum damage claim was awardable to the plaintiff
and the fact that the violation was "at most a technical and debatable violation." 54
F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Similar recognition of the importance of the "private
attorney general" role to the enforcement of these statutes, and the necessity of awards
of fees if that role is to be encouraged, prevails in decisions of courts passing on these
"mandatory" fee shifting statutes. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F.
Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943) (Fair Labor Standards Act):
The government has set up a regulatory system for the benefit of persons in the
plaintiff's class. . . .Suits by plaintiffs, if well founded are in the public interest.
Therefore, the cost of prosecuting successful suits should be borne. . . by those who
have violated the regulations and caused the damage.
The concept of "private attorney general" had its genesis in the seminal opinion of
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)
(reconciling Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 316 U.S.
4 (1942), with traditional standing cases). The issue in Ickes was not the award of attor-
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The theoretical foundation of this response is neither "full
compensation" to the injured party nor punishment of the wrongdoer. Rather, the foundation is utilization of fee awards as a
device to encourage necessary private enforcement of publically
important statutes by freeing the enforcing party from the burden
of bearing his own costs.
A second category of federal "fee-award" statutes permit,
but do not mandate, awards of attorneys' fees. These statutes
cover a broad spectrum of federal law37 and authorize awards to
successful plaintiffs, in some cases, and, in others, to the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant.
Many, but not all, of these statutes expressly limit the power
conferred therein to award attorneys' fees to cases in which the
losing party exhibited bad faith in litigating. Under such statutes
fee awards are intended to be punitive and deterrent, rather than
compensatory or incentive, devices. Accordingly, given the express legislative limitation to bad faith contained in such statutes, courts tend to view them as deterrents to frivolous litigation
rather than as compensatory devices or as incentives to bring
suits seeking to vindicate public policy.38 There are other discretionary "fee-award" statutes which lack this express limitation,
but which confine fee awards to the same instances by requiring
a finding that the violation complained of was "willful" or "knowing." 39 Predictably, this punishment justification under either of
neys' fees but standing to challenge administration action. The case held that Congress
could confer authority on private persons to challenge administrative action "even if the
sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to
speak, private Attorney Generals." 134 F.2d at 704. After general acceptance of the propriety of private enforcement of public rights, it was but a simple step further for courts
to shift attorney's fees in order to facilitate the "private Attorney General's" vindication
of the public interest.
37. See also the procedural rules which authorize fee awards in such instances as
wrongful refusals to answer questions propounded by interrogatory, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a);
wrongful refusals to admit the genuineness of documents or the truth of statements subsequently proven to be genuine or true, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c); and the wrongful prosecution
of frivolous appeals, FED. R. App. P. 38. Cf. Eaton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ.,
459 F.2d 684, 686 (4th Cir. 1972) where fees were awarded under FED. R. App. P. 38 because
the prosecution of the appeal was "of such a frivolous nature."
38. Examples include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) ("[I]f
the court believes the suit or defense to have been without merit ...
"); the Trust
Indentive Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1970) ("[Hlaving due regard to the merits and
good faith of the suit or defense ....
"); and the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, which
refers to awards to the prevailing party in "exceptional cases", which by judicial decision
has been construed to refer to cases in which the court finds "unfairness or bad faith in
the conduct of the losing party." Keuffel & Esser Co. v. Masback, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 237,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), quoting Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir.
1951).
39. Examples of these statutes, limited in scope because they incorporate specific
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these types of statutes has limited the number of cases in which
such awards are made, since the award of fees focuses on the
defendant's subjective motivation rather than on the effect of the
defendant's acts.40 This focus probably explains the relative inadequacy of awards made thereunder,4 ' even in the infrequent instance when such awards are made.
Of greater theoretical importance are a growing number of
statutes which grant courts discretionary power to award attorney's fees but which do not, by their terms, limit the authority
granted to instances where the losing party exhibits undue litigiousness or bad faith.42 Contextually, however, the American
experience has been hostile to awards of attorneys' fees generally.
Despite early recognition of equity's power to fashion whatever
remedies were appropriate to a given situation, American federal
courts were consistently held powerless to grant attorneys' fees,
43
even in cases involving violations of important federal statutes.
Moreover, the only experience courts had with statutory awards
was either in cases arising under statutes containing mandatory
fee award provisions44 or in cases arising under statutes containing discretionary fee award provisions, the purpose of which was
clearly punitive and which contained "good faith" limitations in
"scienter" requirements, are the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e),
78r(a) (1970) (fees may be levied against any person who "willfully" violates the Act); and
the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970) (knowing violations).
40. See, e.g., Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Costs: The Copyright
Experience, 4 GA. L. REv. 571, 582-86 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Experience]. It is
interesting to note that the copyright statute does not, by express language, incorporate
any punitive requirements, but a "good faith" requirement has been uniformly implied
by courts. Compare Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970) ("[Tlhe court may award to
the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee.
... ) with, e.g., Ziegelheim v. Flohr,
119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (good faith violation of statute held not to mandate
award of fees). See also discussion on current judicial treatment of similar "discretionary"
statutes at text accompanying notes 58 et seq., infra.
41. Experience, supra note 40, at 588-89.
42. The prime examples of this statutory type are the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970) (fees may be awarded "to pay the fees of
counsel" of the labor union member); Title II, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a3(b) (1970) (discrimination in public accommodations-"[T]he court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee ....
"); Emergency
School Aid Act, § 718, 86 Stat. 235 (school desegregation-"The court ....
in its discretion, upon a finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring about compliance, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fees."). Similar standards are
contained in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) with the additional
proviso, not yet well-explored, that the court find that the "plaintiff... is not financially
able to assume said attorney's fees."
43. See discussion at note 65 infra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 34 to 36 supra and accompanying text.
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such awards. 5 Given this experience, and this historical hostility,
early cases interpreting discretionary statutes which did not incorporate punitive requirements limited the application of such
statutes to instances where the taxed party had acted in bad
faith, despite the lack of any such limitation in the statute. 6
The first Supreme Court case modifying this hostile approach to fee awards under statutes containing discretionary fee
award provisions was Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,Inc.,'
The case arose under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,48
which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and
which provides that a "court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee." Consistent
with the practice of early federal cases, this provision, prior to
Newman, was construed to be oriented toward punishment, not
toward incentive, and was limited to the "obdurate" defendant
who litigated in bad faith.
The Newman petitioners sought to enjoin racial discrimination in five drive-in restaurants and one sandwich shop operated
by defendants. The district court enjoined discrimination in the
shop but refused to do so with respect to the five drive-ins. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the refusal to enjoin discrimination at the drive-ins and remanded with instructions to award
counsel fees, but only to the extent that defenses had been advanced for the "purposes of delay and not in good faith."4 The
circuit court had adopted this subjective standard because of the
limited, and punitive, view it took of attorneys' fee awards:
"[N]o litigant ought to be punished under the guise of an award
of counsel . . .from taking a position in court in which he honestly believes . . .- 0
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, affirmed and
modified. The Court held that the discretion granted by the statute was a limited one that ought to be exercised in favor of fee
awards in all but exceptional cases: "One who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust."'"
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See note 38 supra.
See, e.g., the experience under the copyright laws, note 40 supra.
390 U.S. 400 (1968), noted in, 4 HARv. CIV. RIGHTs-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 223 (1969).
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id.
390 U.S. at 402.
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Of much greater importance to subsequent doctrinal development than the Court's holding, however, was the Court's refusal to base awards on any limited basis such as punishment or
to require any lengthy examination of subjective motivation. Instead, the Court based its holding on a very broad and considerably more positive policy:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation
would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means
of securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is
thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action
under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains
an injunction he does so not for himself alone but also as a
"private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees,
few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for
counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but,
more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title Ul.12
Given the broad language of the Newman opinion, it is not
surprising that its holding with respect to granting attorneys' fees
as a matter of course has been consistently applied in subsequent
52. Id. at 401-02. This broad language was unnecessary for the decision to grant
attorneys' fees. Even under a subjective test, fees would have been awarded. See 390
U.S. at 402 n.5. The defendants had interposed frivolous defenses such as the unconstitutionality of the Act (raised after the Court's decision in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1965) in which Title II was expressly held to be constitutional) and the invalidity of
Title II because it " 'contravenes the will of God' " and therefore interfered with the defendants' first amendment rights, 377 F.2d at 438 (Winter & Sobeloff, JJ., concurring).
The breadth of the opinion's language signalled a strong desire to base attorney's fees on
a more consistent and objective basis and, therefore, was not merely due to a desire to
reach a result in this particular case.
The student author of Note, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees, 4 HARv. CIv. RIGHTs-CIv.
LIB. L. REv. 223 (1969), severely criticizes the reasoning of the Newman Court. He maintains that by logic and by legislative history the result reached is unsupportable, Id. at
225. While not resolving the policy question of whether the result is desirable, the student
author asserts that another vehicle, such as an objective good faith standard, might be
preferable to a mandatory fee shift to implement the policy objective of opening access to
the courts. He concludes: "Under a mandatory test there is less incentive for a defendant
to avoid dilatory conduct than there would be [under another test] because the defendant
will be taxed with the fee regardless of his good faith." Id. at 228. Curiously, this conclusion ignores the higher attorney's fees that such a dilatory approach would incur.
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cases arising under other statutes authorizing discretionary
awards. Thus, cases arising under the employment antidiscrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 53
the Fair Housing Act of 1968,11 the school desegregation provisions of the Emergency School Aid Act,55 and, of course, subsequent cases under Title 156 have made it clear that federal courts
regard awards to prevailing parties in these cases almost as "automatic"; this disposition leaves only the issue of amount. More
importantly, even though the Newman Court did suggest that
there might
be circumstances which would render fee awards
"unjust,"5 7 courts have been singularly unwilling to find such
circumstance in any case. 58 As a result, therefore, the same philosophical premise, founded upon the "private attorney general"
function which is manifested in judicial response to the mandatory fee award statutes, has become the premise for the almost
automatic award of fees in cases arising under this type of discretionary fee award statute.
This is not an uncomfortable position. The need for fee
awards, as an incentive to private enforcement of public rights,
is a serious one. Limiting the exercise of discretion to "unusual"
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e)(5)(k) (1970). See, eg., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d
8; (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (Boreman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
maintaining that Title II differs from Title VII and that special circumstances exist in the
instant case).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291 (D.
Md. 1973).
55. 86 Stat. 235, 369. In Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools,
412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam), the Court vacated a judgment of the Sixth Circuit which
had denied an award. In holding that section 718 (which authorizes discretionary fee
awards to the prevailing party in school desegregation cases) requires such an award to
the party plaintiff "unless circumstances should render such an award unjust," the Court
cited Newman and construed section 718 in pari passu with section 204(b) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
56. But see United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871 (D. R.I. 1970) (not applying
Newman, but as a matter of course awarding fees to a private defendant who successfully
defended a Title II case). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes awards to the
"prevailing party", as do many of these statutes. Others limit awards to successful
plaintiffs.
57. 390 U.S. at 402.
58. E.g., Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1970)
(decided under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) is an interesting illustration of the
narrowness with which the "unjust circumstances" exception is construed. Plaintiffs were
denied injunctive relief, 259 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. La. 1966). This initial denial was affirmed,
on appeal, by a panel of the Fifth Circuit, 391 F.2d 86 (1967). On rehearing, en banc, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, 394 F.2d 342 (1968). On remand, the district
court refused to award attorney's fees because it believed that the two rulings in favor of
the defendant established the litigable merit of the defendant's case, and that an award
would therefore be "unjust." On a subsequent appeal, the Fifth Circuit, citing Newman,
reversed the denial of fees.
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cases, i.e., to cases in which the private law enforcement value is
properly subordinated to other factors, is therefore entirely justifiable. After all, too much discretion in the awarding or withholding of fees could destroy enforcement efforts by its guarantee of
unequal results."
The shift in emphasis from "punishment" to "incentive"
dictates limits on a court's discretion for yet another reason. A
court may need to exercise some discretion when finding and
weighing the facts upon which a determination of subjective intent is to be made, as is the case when the basis of the award is
punitive. However, once the basis for awards shifts to granting
incentive to enorce important public rights, it becomes another
thing altogether to suggest that a court can exercise its discretion
and determine that a particular substantive area in which a statute authorizes fees is of so little public importance that the incentive value of fee awards is unnecessary and, thus, can deny fees.
The decisions that the private enforcement of the right granted
by the statute is important and that the award of fees aids in
vindicating this publicly important right by the creation of an
incentive to litigate have been made by the legislature. There is
simply no room for a discretionary re-determination of either
decision.
Extra-Statutory0 Exceptions to the American Rule
Federal courts possess all those equitable powers with which
the English Chancery court was endowed." This includes the
power "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief," 2 where federally secured rights are invaded, and to select
and to provide "such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose."63 Part of the courts' power to adjust
their "remedies" includes the power to grant costs, including a
reasonable attorney's fee in "proper cases." 64 Early experience
59. See K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969) and Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
60. "Extra statutory" is defined as those cases which arise under federal statutes
which do not provide for attorney's fees. Therefore, any fee awards must be based on
equity's inherent power to adjust remedies rather than on specific authority contained in
the statute itself.
61. Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869).
62. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). See cases cited note 64 infra.
63. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
64. "Plainly the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for
the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original
authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation." Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
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limited the scope of "proper cases," however, to those cases decided under a federal statute that specifically provided for awards
65
of attorneys' fee.
The early exercise of this "equitable power" in extra statutory situations was limited and somewhat confused. Federal
courts regularly gave awards in only two categories of
cases-those cases in which the taxed party was thought guilty
of litigating in bad faith, in which the awards were based on a
punishment theory,6" and those cases in which a monetary fund
was created, in which the awards were based on a "benefit"
theory."
The Punishment Rationale: Of Bad Faith
and Obstinate Obduracy
As part of its power to do equity in a particular situation, a
federal court has the unquestioned power to award fees to a party
when his opponent has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."68 The underlying rationale is
punitive, and the basis is the existence of some form of "bad
faith" on the part of the unsuccessful litigant. A common formulation of the basis for punitive awards in this area is: "The bringing of the action should have been unnecessary and was compelled by the [defendant's] unreasonable obdurate obstinacy." 9
Typically coupled with this substantive formulation of the test is
the additional principle that the initial determination of such
"obstinacy" is a discretionary function of the district court, which
discretion will be disturbed only in "compelling circumstances. 70
This test is primarily subjective, and, once we grant the fact that
much of litigation is in fact an abuse of legal principles for
negotiating or bargaining purposes, 7 ' it is predictable that, with
some exceptions,7 2 applications of this punitive test will be conBank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939). See also Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry., 28
F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929), for an exhaustive
examination of the early decisions.
65. See Philip v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1874). Cf. discussion in Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967).
66. See discussion at text accompanying note 69 infra.
67. See discussion at text accompanying note 78 infra.
68. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1709 (1972 ed.).
69. Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir. 1965).
70. Id.
71. See discussion at note 25 supra and accompanying text.
72. There are categories of cases in which this punitive theory is applied consistently. For example, awards to parties who institute contempt proceedings due to the
contemner's violation of a prior court order have been consistent, R. GOLDFARB, THE:
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fused and inconsistent. Thus, courts have awarded fees under the
"obstinacy" standard in reapportionment cases7 3 and have also
denied fees in such cases on essentially similar facts.74 A similar
pattern existed in school desegregation cases, in which many
courts made such awards7" and as many refused to do so." Not
surprisingly, no real factual differences can be discerned that
clearly justify or differentiate one set of decisions from another.
In all these cases the plaintiffs prevailed, and either the state had
not reapportioned or the school board had not desegregated in
accordance with law. Neither would have done so but for the
suits. Given the importance of these facts other factors present
in the cases simply pale into insignificance.
Given the discretionary and subjective nature of the punitive
rationale and the random results it produced, courts took impetus
from the Newman decision" and its progeny in the statutory area
and developed alternative and more objective grounds upon
which to base extra-statutory fee awards, grounds which were
realistically related, to the policy objective of fee awards.
POWER (1971). Similarly, awards in malicious prosecution or abuse of process
cases in which the cost of defending the prior and wrongfully instituted cases are consistent. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 671(b); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1954). Another example
of a consistent pattern of application are cases in which the taxed party caused the
prevailing party to incur expenses in a prior lawsuit resulting from the taxed party's fraud
or breach of contract. See, e.g., McOsker v. Federal Ins. Co., 115 Kan. 626, 224 P. 53 (1924)
(recovery of fees expended in defending suit by bona fide purchaser of insurance notes
fraudulently taken from plaintiff by defendant); Edwards v. Beard, 211 Ala. 251, 100 So.
101 (1924) (award to buyer of goods sold with warranty of title where third party successfully established title to goods in previous action).
73. Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974, 987 (N.D. Miss. 1969) ("[Tlhe bringing of this
action was made necessary by the board of supervisors' unreasonable and obstinate refusal
to redistrict itself.") (distinguishing Damon v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors,
note 74 infra, on the basis of the attempt of the community to encourage the Board to
redistrict).
74. Damon v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors, 254 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss.
1966) (three judge court) (per curiam) (award denied even though "there was a great need
for such redistricting" and it was "accomplished solely as a result of this action").
75. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d 206 (4th
Cir. 1966); Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 336 F. Supp. 1275, 1287 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Cato
v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968).
76. Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 111 (9th Cir. 1972) (affirming denial of attorney's
fees when defendant was not obdurate in resisting plaintiffs demands and in complying
with desegregation orders); Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070, 1075
(4th Cir. 1969) (Sobeloff & Winter, JJ., dissenting from holding of the majority that appeal
by defendant was of sufficient merit so as not to necessitate the award of counsel fees
under Rule 38); Rogers v. Paul, 232 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Ark. 1964) (defendants moved
with enough deliberate speed so that counsel fees not awarded).
77. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
CONTEMPT
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The "Common Fund" Rationale: Of Class Benefits
and Therapeutic Values
Cases in which the prevailing party created, increased or
protected a common fund in the hands of a court for distribution
to claimants" present the most common situation in which extrastatutory fees have been consistently awarded to successful litigants. In the typical application, the plaintiff's suit results in
recovery of a fund which is then distributed pro rata to all of the
members of the plaintiff's class. The plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund, before distribution. Not to do so would
be unjust to the plaintiff because it "would give to the other
parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair
advantage.

79

It should be noted that this category of cases does not involve
a shifting of fees from the prevailing party to the losing party. All
the losing party pays, theoretically, are the damages, out of which
are subtracted legal fees before the fund's distribution to the
plaintiff's class. In other words, the theory behind these awards
is to spread the costs of creating the fund proportionately among
those sharing in the fund by charging the fund itself, prior to
distribution.,"
Despite this "cost spreading" language, these "fund" cases
also effect a second policy consideration, based upon a recognition of both the incentive value of high fee awards and the necessity for litigation in certain important areas of the law. As explained by Hornstein, explicit recognition of the incentive value
of a fee award led the courts to be generous in encouraging suits'
78. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (trust funds); See
also Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1949).
79. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882). See generally Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Hornstein].
80. As stated by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff "confers a substantial benefit on
the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970). The
type of cases in which such awards have been made are varied indeed. They include
taxpayer's suits, e.g. Council of Village of Bedford v. State ex rel. Thompson, Hine &
Flory, 123 Ohio St. 413, 175 N.E. 607 (1931); utility rate refund cases, Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 648 (1939); suits to enjoin
payment of corporate dividends, Harris v. Chicago, Great W. Ry., 197 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.
1952); and shareholder's derivative suits, Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F.
Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). In these cases, funds were gathered for distribution, and courts
spoke of "spreading the cost" among the financial beneficiaries as the primary justification for the awards.
81. Hornstein, at 662-64. This position is supported by the case law; see, e.g., the
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of a salutary nature.
They are therapeutic, helping to maintain the health of our
corporate system. In hundreds of suits which would not have
been instituted without the allure of generous compensation,
a miscarriage of justice has been prevented. At the same
time the record of litigated cases is a prophylactic-a deterrent to future wrongdoing. Every successful suit duly rewarded encourages other suits to redress misconduct and by
the same token discourages misconduct which would occasion suit. There can be no doubt that these derivative suits
have materially raised the standards of fiduciary relationships and of other economic behavior. 2
In recognition of these "therapeutic" effects, courts permitted fee awards in cases where no actual fund was created for
distribution, but where obvious benefit accrued to others as a
result of the litigation. Thus, in Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, 1 petitioner succeeded in placing a lien on the proceeds of
certain earmarked bonds sold on behalf of a bank which had
closed and gone into receivership and in having these proceeds
applied to her trust account. This was not a class suit, but the
stare decisis effect of her suit would benefit fourteen other trusts
in situations precisely like petitioner's. The Court had little difficulty in finding justification for an award of fees, paid by the
receiver and charged to the estate's assets; the Court drew the
obvious analogy to the traditional "fund" theory:
[Tihe formalities of the litigation-the absence of an
avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were,
through stare decisis rather than through a decree-hardly
touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a party
and the beneficiaries of his litigation."
Subsequent cases expanded this doctrine yet further to encompass at least some cases in which there was neither any fund
created nor any class suit. Thus, in Mills v. Electric Auto-lite
Co.,85 shareholders of Electric Auto-lite sought dissolution of a
cases cited in Hornstein, supra note 79, at 666-70.
82. Id. at 663.
83. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). A useful collection of other examples is found in Annot., 49
A.L.R. 1149 (1949).
84. 307 U.S. at 167.
85. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The case is noted in an excellent article, Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Allocation].
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merger with Mergenthaler Linotype because proxies had been
solicited by a misleading proxy statement unlawful under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act."' The district court found that the
proxy statements were misleading and referred the case to a special master to fashion relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that, although the statements were false, the plaintiffs had
failed to prove a causal link between the misleading statements
and the merger. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
district court's order. The Court then ruled that interim attorneys' fees be awarded. In discussing the propriety of such an
award, the Court seemingly based its decision both on the "benefit to the class" rationale so long associated with traditional
"fund" cases and on the "incentive" rationale which it had earlier
applied in Newman, but which it had never applied to extrastatutory cases:
In many suits under § 14(a), particularly where the violation
does not relate to the terms of the transaction for which
proxies are solicited, it may be impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit. Nevertheless, the stress placed by
Congress on the importance of fair and informed corporate
suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service
to the corporation and its shareholders. Whether petitioners
are successful in showing a need for significant relief may be
a factor in determining whether a further award should later
be made. But regardless of the relief granted, private stockholders' actions of this sort "involve corporate therapeutics,"
and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an
important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. To
award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has
succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle
the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose them
on the class that has benefited from them and that would
have had to pay them had it brought the suit."
The difficulty with the opinion, of course, is that reliance on
the "fund" rationale for decision seems misplaced because the
"benefit to all shareholders" said to result from this case seems
illusory. The district court's decision neither created a monetary
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). The Court
had earlier held that the federal courts should imply a private cause of action under
section 14(a), although none are specifically provided therein, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
87. 396 U.S. at 396-97 (citations omitted).
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fund nor fashioned a remedy of any form. The appeal was taken
before any determination of relief by the special master. Therefore, given this status, how can it be clear that the stockholders
directly benefited if the issue of damages and remedy is so
murky? Given the lack of tangible benefit, it would seem that the
real basis for the decision must have been the desire to encourage
the bringing of suits which vindicate the statutory policy; the
"fund" cases were used as a convenient, but fictional, analogy to
reach that result.
Others read the Mills case in a similar fashion. The case has
been cited for the "incentive" or "therapeutic" rationale by
courts," and at least some commentators suggested that after
Mills "the dominant element in the decision-making process may
be the emergence of a consensus as to the societal benefits of
encouraging private law enforcement."8 However, the Court has
indicated its unwillingness to take so vigorous a step in Hall v.
Cole,! a case decided last term, which, while extending fee
88. E.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Lee].
In Mills the Supreme Court sharply distinguished Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (denying an award of attorney's fees under the
Lanham Act where the particular statute under which plaintiff brought suit was silent
on the award of attorney's fees) and limited Fleischmann to the situation where the
specific statute sued under meticulously details the remedies available to a plaintiff and
thus, by implication, limits the remedies to those so detailed. The district court in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 314 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1970), attempted to
rely on Fleischmann to distinguish Mills. In Yablonski plaintiff brought suit under the
Landrum-Griffith Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(c), 482, 483, 501, 529 (1970), and asked for
attorney's fees even though the specific acts challenged were prohibited by statutory
sections which were silent on the question of fee awards. The district court had earlier
granted a preliminary injunction, but in this proceeding dismissed these charges as moot.
It denied attorney's fees on the rationale that plaintiff was seeking a private benefit and
would not confer a benefit to a class. Moreover, for the district court the case was analogous to Fleischmann because the Landrum-Griffith Act specified remedies in a complex
regulatory scheme. The circuit court reversed, first on the issue of mootness, 459 F.2d 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1972), and then on the issue of the denial of attorney's fees, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). According to the circuit court, the question was whether Congress had precluded "the allowance of such fees." 466 F.2d at 428. Then, citing Mills, the circuit court
stated:
Absent the positive interposition by Congress of a barrier to judicial allowance of
attorney's fees, we note . . . the inherent power . . . to award attorney's fees where
an individually initiated law suit has brought benefits to a wider group.
466 F.2d at 430.
This circuit court opinion in Yablonski was cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9, (1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes 90 et seq.,
infra).
89. Allocation, supra note 85, at 328. From Mills the Note draws obvious implications favoring fee shifting in a host of socially important areas such as civil rights, consumer protection and environmental cases. Id. at 331.
90. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
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awards to a new substantive area, does so on a theoretical extension of the "benefit to the class" rationale and disavows any
intention to adopt generally the "private law enforcement" rationale.
In Hall the Court affirmed an award of attorneys' fees made
to a union member who had been expelled from his union in
violation of Section 102 of the Labor Management and Disclosure
Act.91 The Court affirmed the award on the basis of the "class
benefit" rationale:
[Bly vindicating his own right of free speech . . . respondent necessarily rendered a substantial service to his union
as an institution and to all its members . . . . Thus, as in
Mills, reimbursement of respondent's attorney's fees out of
the union treasury simply shifts the costs of litigation to "the
class that has benefited ..
"92
The Court specifically refrained from passing on the applicability
of the "incentive" or "therapeutic" or "private attorney general"
rationale as a basis for the award:
Citing our decisions in Mills . . . and Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., . . . respondent contends that the
award of attorneys' fees in this case might also be justified
on the ground that, by successfully prosecuting this litigation, respondent acted as a " 'private attorney general' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of highest priority.". .. In light of our conclusion with respect to the "common benefit" rationale, however, we have no occasion to
s
93
consider that question.
The difficulty here is, once again, the necessarily fictional
basis of the purported benefits. As Justices White and Rehnquist
point out in dissent, member-union litigation "often involves [no
more than] private feuding having no general significance,"9' 4 a
perception which is borne out by the fact that the Union members
continued to elect those who had "harmed them" for the 5 year
period in which the case was being litigated.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). Title I of the Act, under which suit was brought, is
entitled the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."
92. 412 U.S. at 8.
93. Id. at 6, n.7. Two cases cited by the Court in this passage, Knight v. Auciello,
453 F.2d 852 (lst Cir. 1972) and Lee, are examples of cases in which courts have gone
beyond the "benefit" or "fund" rationale to base awards, explicitly, on an "incentive to
private law enforcement" basis.
94. 412 U.S. 16.
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Obviously, the "fund" category of cases has grown beyond its
relatively modest origins in "common fund" cases to encompass,
at least, all the cases in which the plaintiff confers some benefit
on the members of an ascertainable class, even if that benefit is
not monetary and the suit is not, technically, a class action. It is
enough that the case "corrects or prevents an abuse which would
be prejudicial to the rights and interests of those others ' 5 and
that "the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among [the members of the benefited class].",'
In summary, the chief exceptions to the American rule are:
awards of fees under either mandatory or discretionary statutes
authorizing such awards; and awards of fees in a growing number
of extra-statutory categories, developed as adjuncts to equity's
power to fashion effective remedies, the most important examples
of which are those awards granted under a punitive rationale or
under the "common fund" rationale and its extension, the "class
benefit" rationale. Despite the different theoretical foundations
of these rationales, there is a common thread running through all
these exceptional categories, which the Supreme Court has not
yet explicitly accepted as an independent basis for fee awards.
That thread is the fact that fee awards open access to courts for
those whose financial resources or financial stake in the litigation
otherwise limit access and, further, that creating this new access
necessarily encourages litigation of a type thought sufficiently
important that its encouragement is believed desirable.
FEE AWARDS IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION:
FROM EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE

Many, but by no means all, civil rights and constitutional
cases can be subsumed by some one or other of the presently
accepted categories qualifying for awards. For example, many
school desegregation, housing discrimination, and employment
discrimination cases fall within the category of cases in which
awards are authorized by statute. 7 Similarly, awards may be
available in some of these cases as a result of the application of
the punitive equitable doctrines discussed earlier,9" or the appli95. Id. at 6 n.7.
96. Id. at 5.
97. See note 42 supra.
98. Note 68 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, - F.
Supp. -,
Civ. No. 3501-N (M.D. Ala. 1972), in which the court awarded fees to the
prevailing prisoners in a suit alleging and proving the "barbarous" inadequacy of prison
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cation of the "common fund""9 or "benefit to the class" doctrines."" The dependence of awards on these theories, however,
would result in lack of awards 'in too many important areas of
private civil rights or constitutional enforcement. Statutory authorization of awards is spotty at best, and extra-statutory doctrines would have to be utilized to authorize awards in most
cases. Neither the "common fund" doctrine nor its newest variant, the "benefit to the class" doctrine, could be expected to
apply to most civil rights cases.' 0' Most awards in these cases
would have to be made, if at all, pursuant to the equitable doctrines which are punitively oriented.'" 2
The punitive doctrine, because of its subjective nature and
its unpredictable results, is a most unsatisfactory basis upon
which to attempt to foster private enforcement of civil or constitutional rights. As has often been noted, it is no solace to the
person deprived of his civil or constitutional rights that that deprivation was accomplished in good faith.0 3 It is no greater solace
medical facilities in Alabama. The court found the violations to be "willful and intentional
violations of the [eighth amendment] rights of prisoners." Compare reapportionment
cases, notes 73-74 supra, and school desegregation cases, notes 75-76 supra. Most extrastatutory awards in civil rights cases brought against private discriminators would probably have to be made from this category, since neither the "common fund" nor "common
benefit" doctrines would be expected to be applicable to most cases. See notes 99-100
infra.
99. There have been instances in which suits to cure violations of civil rights have
resulted in the creation of funds for distribution to those injured. See, e.g., Ojeda v.
Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972), in which attorney's fees were awarded out of a fund
of $2,519,000, which consisted of retroactively awarded welfare benefits. But given the
injunctive nature of most civil rights and constitutional cases, and the lack of provable
damages resulting from violations, the cases qualifying for awards under this category
would be rare cases, indeed.
100. See text accompanying note 95 supra. Instances in which such awards could
be made are illustrated by Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
Black locomotive firemen successfully enjoined the operation of an agreement between the
railroad and the union, which agreement had deprived plaintiffs of seniority rights. Id. at
481. The court held that fees could be taxed against the union. Although the court did
not use the "common benefit" doctrine in so doing, the facts of the case would permit
such an award under that doctrine by analogy with the Hall case, discussed in text
accompanying note 90 supra. Again, however, instances of the application of this doctrine
to civil rights cases could be expected to be rare. Most cases do not present instances in
which the benefit would result to "members of an ascertainable class" and in which the
"court's jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . makes possible an award that will
operate to spread the costs proportionately among..." the members of that class. Hall,
412 U.S. at 5. Indeed, in most, if not all, civil rights cases brought against private parties,
it would be manifestly impossible, and very often unfair where possible, to make the
benefited class, rather than the losing party, bear the costs.
101. See notes 99 and 100 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 69 and 25 supra.
103. "It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protection of the laws
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to the would-be litigant to learn that he can afford to vindicate
his civil rights if the deprivor is wantonly motivated, but that the
same deprivation is beyond redress, because beyond his financial
capacity, if the deprivor acts with a pure heart.
There is an alternative rationale upon which awards in civil
rights and constitutional cases could legitimately be based, a
rationale which is, at least, the partial, if implied, basis of many
of the other exceptions: the "private attorney general" rationale.
This rationale would be the basis of a fee award in any case,
whether it is a class action or not, whether the suit benefits others
who can be made to bear the costs of litigation or not and whether
the defendant acts in bad faith or not. All that would be required
for its application is that the policy vindicated by the plaintiffs'
successful suit be one which the court awarding the fees deems
of "the highest priority."'" 4 In other words, awards under this
rationale would be made, not because of the defendant's bad
faith, nor even because the suit benefited others who can, and
should, bear their proportionate share of that benefit. Awards
hereunder would be made simply because a court recognizes that
such awards do create access and do encourage either litigation
or the recognition of rights without litigation. Awards would be
made in those cases simply to encourage litigation of a type sufficiently important that we wish to encourage persons to undertake
the litigation. Hence, the only prerequisite for its application
would be a judicial determination that the suit involves questions
of sufficient importance that such encouragement and, therefore,
such awards are desirable.
This "private attorney general" rationale has been explicitly
applied by the Supreme Court in but one area-in cases arising
under statutes specifically authorizing fee awards.1', In such
cases, the Court has, quite properly, ruled that congressional authorization of fee awards in a particular statutory scheme is
equivalent to congressional determination that the policies expressed by that statute are "of the highest priority" and that
those vindicating them, in successful litigation, are therefore entitled to fee awards.
Thus far, the Court has declined to reach the question of
application of the "private attorney general" rationale to cases
that it was done in good faith .
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 725 (1961).
104. Newman at 402. For lack of a better term, and in accordance with usage (see
Hall) the term "private attorney general" describes this doctrinal basis for fee awards.
105. See discussion note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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arising under statutes which do not explicitly authorize fee
awards, although civil rights and constitutional litigation seem to
be two categories of cases in which the rationale could, and
should, be uniformly applied despite the lack of statutory authorization.
That this rationale has been adopted in cases arising in a
statutory context, but not otherwise, seems primarily a function
of judicial deference to legislative policy making. In cases arising
under statutes which authorize fee awards, unlike the case of
purely extra-statutory awards, Congress has explicitly made clear
the priority it assigns to certain policies. Courts often deem that
assessment of the relative priority of public policies is best suited
to legislative, rather than judicial, determination. It is for this
precise reason that some courts have refused to extend the "private attorney general" rationale to extra-statutory cases. Such
awards "will launch courts upon the difficult and complex task
of determining what is public policy, an issue normally reserved
for legislative determination . .. ."I
106. Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. granted, 412 U.S. 937 (1973).
See Note, Civil Rights-Attorneys Fees, 4 HARv. CIV. RIGHTs-Civ. Lia. L. REv. 223, 225
(1969), discussed at note 52 supra, in which the author, characterizing the Newman
Court's award of fees as "mandatory," states: "No logical imperative leads to the conclusion that Congress intended a mandatory fee. If Congress had so intended, it could have
explicitly done so, as it has in a number of statutes."
The position is incorrect. The power to award fees is inherent in courts of equity. No
grant of power to do so is necessary. In the limited number of circumstances described in
this Note, the Court has held that equity should exercise this power to encourage litigation
which is either of public importance, as in Newman (see discussion accompanying notes
47 et seq., supra), or which benefits others who can be made to bear their proportionate
share of the cost, as in Mills and Hall (see discussion accompanying notes 90 et seq.,
supra). Of course, Congress can add to these exceptions by specifically mandating awards,
as it has done in certain statutes (see discussion accompanying notes 34 et seq., supra).
Since the power to grant fees is inherent in equity's power to "adjust remedies," if
equitable doctrines require the granting of awards in a given case arising under a statute
which is silent on the question, that silence does not, of itself, render the court powerless
to grant such awards. Congress does, indeed, have the power to circumscribe such equitable relief. For example, the Court held that the Lanham Act precluded fee awards in
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), because the
statute "meticulously detailed the remedies available" by provision "for injunctive relief,
. . .recovery measured by the profits that accrued to the defendant, . . . costs of the
action and damages which may be trebled .... " Id. at 719. This meticulous detailing
obviously leads to the inference that these express provisions were intended "to mark the
boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act," Id. at
721.
However, where the statute is silent about the question of fees, and the statute
broadly authorizes the courts to grant such relief as may be appropriate, there is no basis
to infer a congressional intent to deny the courts' power to grant any particular form of
equitable relief, including the traditional power to award fees in appropriate cases. In
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This position has more than passing merit. Short of complete
abrogation of the prevailing American rule, it may well prove
difficult to justify selection of one category of cases, rather than
another, for application of the "private attorney general" rationale, without statutory guidance. When Congress enacts a statute,
it presumably deems the policies expressed therein to be of some
public importance. Thus, some courts perceive no basis for distinguishing the relative importance of actions under one federal statute from actions under another federal statute for the purpose of
making fee awards and encouraging litigation. Notwithstanding
that there is some merit in this position, there are some categories
of cases in which a court's hesitancy to adopt the "private attorney general" rationale in the absence of an authorizing statute is
misplaced. Courts can award attorneys' fees in all civil rights and
constitutional litigation on the basis of the "private attorney general" or "private law enforcement" rationale, even in the absence
of statute, in order to encourage litigation. In these types of cases
courts can do so without fear that the rationale would require
extensive revision of the American rule as it may apply to other
kinds of cases. What distinguishes these cases from all others, for
purposes of justifying extra-statutory fee awards, is that courts
can assuredly conclude that the policies informing them are of
unique public importance. The ease with which courts could find
these cases to be so suited to fee awards appears with but a
moment's reflection.
Civil Rights Litigation
Consider the category of civil rights litigation. As stated earlier, by civil rights cases this article refers to those cases challenging racial discrimination, whether the discriminator be a private
party or a government agent. Although it might seem that these
cases could be considered synonomous with constitutional litigation, there are two important distinctions. First, civil rights cases
may involve, and frequently do involve, private parties only. That
is, civil rights cases may challenge private discrimination, pursuant to statutory authorization, as well as public or governmental discrimination. Thus, in a large class of civil rights cases, the
discriminator, and not the benefited class, would bear the attorneys' fee-there would be, and could be, no analogy to the "beneother words, congressional silence is properly viewed as acquiescence in the exercise of
traditional equitable powers, rather than the contrary. Cf. the Court's discussion of this
point in Hall, 412 U.S. at 10-11.
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fit to the class" rationale, although this analogy could be drawn
in constitutional litigation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, in civil rights cases
the courts would not be operating independently of the legislative
branch in determining the priority with which civil rights cases
are vested. In other words, courts can easily hold that any suit
vindicating the policies of the various anti-discrimination provisions of any statute is "of the highest priority" because Congress
has itself so determined. Thus, to the extent that legislative assessment of priority is considered necessary before the "private
attorney general" rationale can be applied, legislative assessment
already exists. This distinguishes constitutional litigation, with
reference to which no legislative determination exists.
The congressional assessment of the importance of encouraging private litigation to vindicate civil rights is contained in a
large number of statutes. Congress has proscribed racial discrimination and encouraged suits to challenge discrimination, in housing, employment, education and public accommodations, by enacting statutes which specifically provide for awards of attorneys'
fees. 07 Thereby, Congress has already declared that ending racial
discrimination by resort to private litigation, given incentive
through fee awards, is, indeed, of the "highest priority."
The award of attorneys' fees in suits seeking to redress racial
discrimination on some basis other than these statutes is not
subject to the objection of no congressional determination of
priority. For example, suits to redress housing discrimination can
be brought under the Open Housing Act of 1968, which specifically provides for awards of attorneys' fees, 08 or under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which does not."0 9 The essential acts complained of in either suit are identical. The gravamen of either
action is racial discrimination. It cannot be said that the priority
assignable to one case may differ from that assignable to another
by virtue of the fortuity of the technical choice to file suit under
10
one statute rather than under another.
107. See note 42 supra.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
110. The technical choice of one basis for suit rather than another is purely a matter
of procedural or tactical advantage. It is of no substantive significance. Thus, for example,
suits under the 1866 Act can avoid some of the administrative exhaustion necessities of
the 1964 Act, and they may also, in some circumstances, enjoy a longer period of limitations. See James v. Hefler, 320 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The technical choice of
statutes is discussed in Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 159
(1973); Comment, Racial Discriminationin PrivateHousing: Five Years After, 33 MD. L.
REV. 295-98 (1973).
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Simply put, there is no difference in priority to be found
between any cases, regardless of their technical foundation, involving racial discrimination. For this reason both the First' and
the Fifth Circuits" 2 have explicitly extended the "private attorney general" rationale, as a basis for fee awards, to cases successfully challenging housing discrimination, even though the
suits had foundations in statutes not specifically providing for fee
awards. The Fifth Circuit stated:
[H]ere as in Mills there is a strong congressional policy
behind the rights declared in § 1982. Awarding attorney's
fees to successful plaintiffs would facilitate the enforcement
of that policy through private litigation.
[I]n fashioning an effective remedy for the rights declared by Congress one hundred years ago, courts should look
not only to the policy of the enacting Congress but also to
the policy embodied in closely related legislation. Courts
work interstitially in an area such as this.
[T]he effective remedy for securing the rights declared
in § 1982 should include the award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs such as provided in the Fair Housing Law,
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c). The same policies supporting Congress'
provision for attorney's fees in that statute apply to fair
housing suits under § 1982.
We think the factors relied on in Piggie Park in interpreting the provision for awarding attorney's fees apply also
to suits under § 1982. The policy against discrimination in
the sale or rental of property is equally strong. The statute,
under present judicial development, depends entirely on private enforcement. Although damages may be available...
in many cases there may be no damages or damages difficult
to prove. To ensure that individual litigants are willing to act
as "private attorneys general" to effectuate the public purposes of the statute, attorney's fees should be as available as
under 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)." 3
The "policy against discrimination" in any actionable form
is self-evidently "equally strong" as the policy against racial discrimination in housing, employment, public accommodations or
111. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 854 (1st Cir. 1972).
112. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
113. Id. at 145-48.
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education, areas in which specific statutes authorizing awards
exist. By working interstitially from these statutes and the discretionary statutes to the silent statutes, courts are not presented
with the problem of total congressional silence. Congress has expressed itself, in areas so closely analagous, as to dispel all rational doubt concerning its view of the priority assignable to the
policy against all forms of racial discrimination, whether private
or public." 4 There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the priority of
these policies, although there might be doubt with respect to non
civil rights federal statutes in which there are no fee award provisions at all, either in the particular statute itself or in any statutes
containing closely related legislation. Thus, awarding fees in civil
rights cases would not require, nor even suggest awards in most
or even all cases arising under other federal statutes.
Despite the current lack of general acknowledgement of the
validity of the theoretical approach outlined above and the lack
of any Supreme Court decision on point, many courts have, of
late, made awards in cases for which the only basis was to encourage private law suits challenging racial discrimination. Thus, the
principle of Lee has been extended to employment discrimination cases brought under the 1866 Act,"' to jury discrimination
114. It is for this reason that the Fourth Circuit's holding in Bradley is surely wrong.
The court reversed an award of fees in a school desegregation case because it felt that there
was insufficient proof of the school board's bad faith and because it refused to adopt the
"attorney general" rationale in school cases. Although its concern about a court's ability
to assign priorities has merit, see discussion note 106 supra, its exercise of that concern in
this case is inappropriate. There simply can be no doubt about the priority of school
desegregation cases. Indeed, if the Fourth Circuit wished to have legislative determination
of priority, that determination existed: Section 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act
(Title VII of the Education Amendments of 1972), P.L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, provides
for awards of attorney's fees in school cases. See note 42 supra. The Fourth Circuit discussed section 718, but refused to consider it applicable because the legal services for
which fees were requested were performed prior to the effective date of section 718. Thus,
the court viewed the sole issue, insofar as section 718 was concerned, to be what the court
characterized as its "retroactivity". This is an unnecessarily restrictive reading of a statute for a court which, in the same opinion, recognized that "determining what is public
policy [is] an issue normally reserved for legislative determination." 472 F.2d at 329.
What the court failed to realize was that section 718 clearly set forth the "legislative
determination" of the importance of school desegregation cases. Surely the Fifth Circuit's
approach in Lee of incorporating remedies enacted in 1968 into the 1866 act, because of
the inescapably close analogy of suits thereunder, was more appropriate to a court of
equity than was the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consider the policy implications of a 1972
Act in connection with a fee award for legal work performed in the 1968-1970 period.
115. Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) ("There is no relevant distinction between a section 1982 suit and a section 1981 suit such as this one."). See District
of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (discussion of both sections 1982 and 1983 in
relation to the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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cases, "6 to cases successfully enjoining the operation of segregated
public housing,"7 and to a miscellany of other racial discrimination cases."' Although few of these opinions adequately articulate
the unique position of racial discrimination cases, their results
are surely correct.
ConstitutionalLitigation
The same "private attorney general" rationale should also
justify fee awards in all constitutional litigation. As noted earlier,
by "constitutional litigation," this article refers to cases in which
the conduct of public officials is challenged on constitutional
grounds. Obviously, there are no general statutes authorizing
awards of fees in these cases, and we are met, at the outset, with
the necessity for making a judicial, not a legislative, determination that constitutional policies are of sufficient priority that successful litigants can be said to be performing a public service by
vindicating those policies in private litigation. But is there any
real difficulty involved in making this determination?
The Constitution itself is law. More, it is the supreme law,
outranking ordinary statutes or common law doctrines. This is
ancient learning, which at this date needs no defense." 9 Additionally, one of the important, indeed the single most important,
function of courts is to assure that public officials act conformably to the authority both given and limited them in the Constitution:
In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous
Court . . .. declared in the notable case of Marbury v.
Madison. . . that "It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." This
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
116. Ford v. White, __ F. Supp. _,
Civil No. 1230(N) (S.D. Miss. Aug. 3, 1972)
("The elimination of discrimination in the jury selection process is certainly a strong
national policy ....
).
117. Taylor v. City of Middleton, F. Supp. -, Civil No. 71-249 (W.D. Tenn.
Apr. 25, 1972).
118. See, e.g., Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971). Attorneys' fees were
awarded after a jury verdict of $4,000 in a suit alleging police harassment of black musician. Attorneys' fees are allowed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases "not simply to penalize litigants, but to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief." 327 F. Supp. at 685.
119. The Constitution is the "fundamental and paramount law of the nation," Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368, 389 (137, 177) (1803).
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Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system ...
Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in
saying that: "If the legislatures of the several states may, at
will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States,
and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the
Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. . . ." United
States v. Peter, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A Governor who asserts
a power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained.120
The hesitancy to adopt the "private attorney general" rationale
which has its origin in questions about a court's competency to
"[determine] what is public policy" 2 ' simply cannot arise when
a court determines the legitimacy of a constitutional challenge to
some public officials' behavior. Such cases are beyond argument
"vindicating [policies] . . . of the highest priority,"'' 2 for they
are no less than constitutional policies.
There is yet another reason to adopt a rule generally authorizing awards of attorneys' fees in constitutional cases. Constitutional litigation is one area in which there is a close confluence
of the "private attorney general" and "benefit to the class" rationales. The original Constitution placed prohibitions on the
national government. And, as a result of the Civil War Amendments,' 2' the Constitution is now understood to prohibit much to
both the national and state governments.'24 All individuals have
rights assertable against all levels of government, rights which are
"of the very essente of a scheme of ordered liberty."'' 5
The plaintiff and, more broadly, those who stand in the same
relation to the successfully challenged activity as stood the plaintiff benefit when rights essential to a "scheme of ordered liberty"
120.

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958). See also C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN
6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BLACK]:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The judicial power is one of the accredited means by which our nation seeks its
goals, including the prime goal, indispensable to political as to personal health, of
self limitation. Intellectual freedom, freedom from irrational discrimination, immunity from unfair administration of law-these (and other similar) are constitutional interests which the Court can protect on ample doctrinal grounds. They often
cannot win protection in rough-and-tumble politics.
Id. at 18-19.
121. Bradley at 329.
122.

Newman at 402.

123.

Particularly, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

124.

See BLACK at 74.

125.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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are vindicated in private litigation. In the broadest and most
accurate sense the beneficiaries are all those who enjoy the protection of constitutional inhibitions on arbitrary government action. An award in these cases would serve to distribute costs to
all beneficiaries-the taxpayers-and in these cases, therefore,
awards of fees are supportable by both the "private attorney general" and "benefit" rationales.
Nor does this unnecessarily torture the "benefit" concept.
Granted, the transient majority may, at different times, be opposed to different constitutional prohibitions. But no less opposed
to enforcement of the Securities Act were the stockholders in
Mills, 26 who approved the merger, or the union members in
27 who re-elected the union leadership. Indeed, there is even
Hall,"'
less torturing of the "benefit" concept in the constitutional area
than there is in the statutory context of which Mills and Hall were
decided. Statutory norms express, at best, policies of the moment. Their effect may or may not benefit those whom Congress
intended to benefit thereunder. The statutes could be wrong. Or,
although some of the "class" may benefit, not all may benefit,
even over the long run. Constitutional norms, on the other hand,
express nothing less than the policies undergirding our society.
They too may be wrong. But, even so, they are all we have-and,
ultimately, all the individual, any individual, has when faced
with assertions of governmental right. Political change may or
may not be a realistic goal in a given case, but the prospect of
change is of no value to one faced with immediate assertions of
arbitrary power. Individuals in this situation should be encouraged to institute litigation which successfully vindicates constitutional norms; from this individual vindication, all would benefit.
The reasoning of Hall is applicable here. Hall authorized an
award of fees under that section of the LMRDA entitled the "Bill
of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations."'' 8 As the Court
pointed out, the successful party in Hall
by vindicating his own right of free speech . . . necessarily
rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution
and to all of its members. When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any of the rights protected by [the
LMRDA], the rights of all members of the union are threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the successful liti126.
127.
128.

See text accompanying notes 85 et seq., supra.
See text accompanying notes 90 et seq., supra.
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
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gant dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of others.'2 9
This point is correct. And it is not any the less correct that all
citizens benefit when any one of them successfully vindicates his
own rights protected by the Constitution. Just as it was in Hall
with respect to the union member's defense of his rights, any
defeat of attempted governmental curtailment of rights granted
by the Constitution and any vindication of a litigant's constitutional rights "necessarily dispels the 'chill' cast upon the rights
of others." This is especially so when the "rights" protected are
those given in the Constitution, rather than in LMRDA.
Accordingly, reimbursement of the successful litigants attorneys' fees out of the public treasury simply accomplishes the
same shifting of the cost of litigation as did reimbursement of the
successful litigants' fees out of the union treasury in Hall. In both
situations, the class that has benefited from the litigation and
that would have had to pay the fees had it brought the suit,
ultimately bears this burden.
Despite the close analogy, however, the preferable basis for
award would be frank adoption of the "private attorney general"
rationale. This rationale seems to express more adequately the
real purpose of such awards: to make access to courts in such
important cases greater than it presently is and to utilize the
incentive nature of fee awards to encourage the hearing of these
important cases. In other words, even though sufficient analogy
to the "benefit" rationale exists, there is no need to engage in
"benefit" analysis when what is truly operating is a recognition
of the desirable consequences of encouraging this type of publicly
important litigation.
All that is required for adoption of the "private attorney
general" rationale is that the successful party indeed vindicates
policies of easily ascertainable importance. Whether the court
can identify a benefited class specifically and tax costs to them
is immaterial. Indeed, in many such cases, they should not be so
taxed. The operative question should not be the existence of a
taxable, benefited class, but the importance of the policy vindicated. When faced with cases which vindicate constitutional policies, courts should have little difficulty in assessing their import30
ance. 1
129. 412 U.S. at 8.
130. There are already a number of cases, albeit a small number, which seem to
adopt this rationale in constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d
59 (5th Cir. 1972) (in section 1983 action awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs' successful
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CONCLUSION

Attorneys' fees ought to be awarded, as a matter of course,
in all cases 3' in which the successful party vindicates civil or
constitutional rights. In all such cases, the successful litigant is,
indeed, acting as a "private attorney general" vindicating rights
of the "highest priority." In the case of civil rights litigation, the
courts need not make the determination themselves since they
have before them the clear interstitial congressional example to
rely upon. In the case of constitutional litigation, brought against
public officials or agencies, the courts lack legislative determination of the importance of the policies vindicated. However, there
is no need for legislative determination of the importance of constitutional policies. That is one determination the courts can
make themselves, without fear of engaging in wholesale revision
of the general American practice on fees, because of the unique
position of the Constitution.
Lest it be understood otherwise, what is said here is not
challenge of the constitutionality of an Alabama practice permitting a justice of the peace
hearing traffic cases to retain portions of the fine imposed); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp.
1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (suit to enjoin public school policy which denied maternity leave to
non-tenured teachers while granting it to tenured teachers); Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp.
556 (E.D. N.C. 1968) (enjoining enforcement of municipality's vagrancy ordinance);
Thorn v. Richardson,
F. Supp. , Civil No. 9577 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 1971) (the
priority given male applicants over female applicants in job training program held
unconstitutional); Cf. Hammond v. Housing Authority & Urban Renewal Agency, 328 F.
Supp. 586 (D. Ore. 1971) (discrimination in public housing-rents for welfare recipients).
131. Fees would have to be awarded on a basis consistent with the "private attorney
general" rationale. Thus, fees should be awarded to the prevailing party and then only if
the prevailing party successfully ended practices denying civil or constitutional rights. In
other words, awards are justifiable only as an incentive to encourage these types of suits.
This purpose would hardly be served by awarding fees to the successful defendant. Indeed,
if awards were made to all prevailing parties, the very private enforcement sought to be
encouraged might be chilled. This is especially the situation in cases, brought to test new
statutes or doctrines, in which the outcome might be in doubt.
Limiting awards to prevailing plaintiffs does run the risk of encouraging nuisance
suits. Cf. discussion at note 25 supra.This has been one fear in the corporate or derivative
suit area, but the fear seems ill-founded in the area of civil rights and constitutional
litigation. Suits against government officials, who are seldom at liberty to settle cases
involving challenges to state statutes, do not present the danger of strike suits. Similarly,
suits seeking an end to racial discrimination seldom involve the threat of large monetary
damage awards that create the favorable context for strike suit settlement in corporate
litigation.
To the extent that there is a danger of creating nuisance suits in this area because of
the encouragement of suits by awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs, this danger can be
averted by the exercise of equity's power to award fees as a punitive measure, see discussion in text accompanying note 68 supra. By this standard, courts could award fees to
prevailing defendants to the extent necessary to counterbalance the danger of frivolous,
bad faith litigation by plaintiffs improperly encouraged by the prospect of fees.

420

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

XXXIII

intended to suggest that awards of attorneys' fees in extra statutory cases cannot or should not be extended to cases involving
other than civil rights and constitutional litigation. The only
point made here is that these latter are fundamentally different
from all other types of private litigation, because of the ease with
which courts can determine their policies to be of particular public importance,i.e., of the "highest priority". Therefore, courts
ought not to hesitate to award fees in these cases if that hesitation
is based on experienced or anticipated difficulty with fee awards
in other categories of cases. Attorneys' fees ought to be awarded,
as a matter of course, in all civil rights and constitutional litigation.

